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The two-sided markets theory has become a hot research topic in the Industrial 
organization area in recent years, and its main focuses are platform enterprises and the 
cross group externalities of consumers' economical activities. One of the most 
essential parts of the market is the platform activities, in which the development of 
equilibrium prices and the non-price competition are the core research areas. The 
topic of this paper, vertical integration strategy, is one of the important and most 
effective strategies in non-Price competition. The vertical integration strategy is one 
economic strategy, in which in two-sided market companies in a supply chain are 
united through a common owner in order to achieve economic advantages. In practice, 
the vertical integration can been seen in various industries, for example operating 
system producers join the development of application software, e-business platform 
integrates the third party payments. Uncommon economic phenomenon can be 
derived from traditional mergers and acquisitions, for example the zero-price and 
negative price in internet economy.  
This paper is based on the above mentioned theories and is divided into three 
parts. First of all, a mechanism model is created based on the two-sided market, which 
classifies the two sided market structure into two parts: perfect monopoly and 
oligopoly. In addition, a comparison of social welfare is conducted on perfect 
monopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition. This paper will then integrate the 
vertical integration strategy into a game theory model, and study its influence on the 
platform enterprises and the social welfare. The last but not the least, two case studies 
from e-business and internet economy area will be discussed to provide empirical 
supports. 
The findings of this paper can be classified into three parts. Firstly, compared 
with the perfect competition market, the equilibrium in the perfect monopoly and 
oligopoly both entail loss of efficiency. Secondly, platform enterprises are willing to 















price subsidies. Thirdly, the platform enterprises choose the entire vertical integration, 
which to some extent solve the supply shortage, but still cannot reach the pareto 
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价行为与自身网络外部性和交叉网络外部性紧密相关。仍然以 Windows XP 系统
为例，Windows XP 系统为软件消费者和应用软件生产者提供交易平台，Windows 
XP 开发商的收益一方面来源于对基于其平台的应用软件开发商应用程序接口
（Application Program Interfaces, APIs）的收费，另外则还包括销售 Windows XP
系统的收入。问题的关键在于，Windows XP 系统两边市场不是分割孤立的，而
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卡，随后在中国各地也出现了抵制银行卡的现象。互联网产业中，涉及到双边市
场的反垄断问题同样存在。2010 年 11 月份，腾讯不满 360 公司通过安全软件对
腾讯旗下的即时通讯软件腾讯 QQ 和其他软件部分内容产品实施恶意卸载，采用
技术手段使即时通讯软件腾讯 QQ 和竞争对手 360 的部分产品不兼容，强制腾讯
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